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Tattlers and Trail Blazers: Attorneys' Liability for 
Clien ts' Fraud 
Barbara Black* 
Unfortunately, newspaper accounts provide support for the view 
that there has been a precipitous decline in professionalism. Even as the 
fallout from the Enron-era corporate scandals works its way through the 
courts, newspapers are filled with allegations of the most recent fraud-
the backdating of employee stock options to guarantee that the recipi-
ents would profit from their exercise. While the story is still unfolding, 
it appears that the practice was prevalent and resulted in inaccurate fi-
nancial statements at many corporations.1 Although to date no outside 
counsel has been publicly implicated in the scandal, at least one general 
counsel has been fired2 and another has been indicted.3 Today, the be-
lief, once expressed by the Seventh Circuit, that professionals would not 
sacrifice their reputations to further their clients' fraud sounds nai"ve.4 
In his article The Corporate/Securities Attomey as a "Moving Target"-
Client Fraud Dilemmas,s Professor Marc Steinberg demonstrates that 
the tightening of ethics standards imposes greater responsibilities on at-
torneys who represent clients that engage in securities fraud, and, as he 
observes, private claimants increasingly seek redress from attorneys for 
damages caused by their clients' fraud. Indeed, some firms have paid 
large amounts in settlement of these claims.6 Courts, however, are skep-
* Professor and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
Many thanks to Professors Lissa Griffin and Steven H. Goldberg for their thoughtful comments on 
this paper. 
1. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday; Some CEOs Reap Millions by 
Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable; Luck - Or Something Else?, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 18, 2006, at AI, available at http://online.wsj.comlpublidresources/documents/info-
optionsscore06-full.htm (discussing corporations that have come under investigation for alleged 
backdating). 
2. Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: The Stock Options Backdating Probe, 235 N.Y. 
L.J. 3 (2006) (firing of McAfee's general counsel); see also Ashby Jones, Tough Times for In-House 
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16,2006, at A12, available athttp://www.online.wsj.comlarticle_printl 
SBI16095786440793402.htm. 
3. See Beth Bar, Former Comverse Executives Confront Backdating Charges, 236 N.Y. L.J. 1 
(2006). 
4. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990). 
5. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Corporate/Securities Attomey as a "Moving Target" - Oient 
Fraud Dilemmas, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2006). 
6. See In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ap-
proving settlement that included Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett LLP's payment of $19.5 million in par-
tial settlement of claims); Nathan Koppel, Executives on Tnal: Lay Says 'Classic Run on Bank' Ru-
ined Enron; Energy Firm's Outside Counsel Sits in the Cross Hairs of Lerach. Securities Oass-
Action Kingpin, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2006, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle_print/ 
91 
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tical, generally, about the deterrent value of private securities fraud 
cases, express concern about the costs they impose on corporate defen-
dants/ and, in particular, are suspicious of plaintiffs' efforts to recover 
from deep-pocket secondary participants like attorneys.8 Congress has 
also made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring securities fraud actions 
by imposing rigorous pleading standards9 and preempting state law se-
curities fraud class actions. lO It would not be surprising, therefore, to 
find judicial reluctance to impose monetary liability on attorneys for 
failing to confront their clients' fraud, particularly since judges well un-
derstand "that any significant increase in attorney liability to third par-
ties could have a dramatic effect upon our entire system of legal eth-
ics."l1 Professor Steinberg notes the contrast: Judge Sporkin, in an 
administrative proceeding arising out of the savings and loan debacle, 
famously asked why not one professional "blew the whistle" to stop the 
fraud,12 while courts, in the context of private damages claims, fre-
quently dismiss the notion that attorneys have a duty to "tattle" on their 
clients.13 Rather, courts may believe, as expressed by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, "that an award of damages under the securities laws is not the way 
to blaze the trail toward improved ethical standards in the legal ... pro-
fession[].,,14 Professor Steinberg's insightful analysis of the ethical rules 
provides a useful opportunity to explore the state of the law on private 
claims for damages for attorneys' breach of these duties. 
The first part of this paper examines judicial treatment, after Cen-
tral Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,15 of federal se-
curities claims made by purchasers and sellers of securities alleging that 
the issuer's attorney participated in the corporation's fraud. The second 
part of the paper explores the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
(SEC) Rules of Professional Conduct as a basis for malpractice claims 
SB114592536742234763.html (law firms increasingly are targeted in securities suits); Matthew Gold-
stein, Going After the Lawyers in Refcos Stunning Fall, THESTREET.COM, Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://www.thestreet.comlpf/markets/matthewgoldstein/10253733.html(regulators looking into role 
law firm played in collapse of brokerage firm). Other instances are cited in Steinberg, supra note 5, 
at 1 nn.2-3. 
7. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a series of cases, restricted the private implied remedies under 
the antifraud rules of the Securities Exchange Act because of its concerns about the special dangers 
presented by frivolous claims. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES 
LAW §§ 7.01-7.02 (3d ed. 2001). 
8. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see 
also discussion infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
9. For an overview of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) see STEINBERG, 
supra note 7, § 7.12. 
10. See discussion of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), infra notes 88-
89 and accompanying text. 
11. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). 
12. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). 
13. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986). 
14. Id 
15. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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brought by or on behalf of the corporation itself against its attorneys for 
failing to report fraud by the corporate management that injured the 
corporation. The third part considers additional state law theories. I 
conclude, in the fourth part, that the likelihood that courts will impose 
liability on attorneys for involvement in their clients' fraud is not sub-
stantial. 
I. LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
Derived from its authorizing statute, § 10(b), which refers to "ma-
nipulative" and "deceptive" devices, Rule lOb-5 generally prohibits two 
forms of securities fraud. Most cases of corporate fraud involve misrep-
resentations of material facts ("deception") and are covered by Rule 
lOb-5(b). Other forms of securities fraud involving conduct and not 
misrepresentations (e.g., classic stock manipulation) are picked up by 
Rule lOb-5(a) and (c). In Central Bank, the Supreme Court, relying 
principally on the statutory language, stated that there was no aiding 
and abetting liability for any type of Rule 10b-5 fraud. The Court, how-
ever, reaffirmed that anyone, including attorneys and accountants, could 
be liable for a Rule 10b-5 violation, "assuming all of the requirements 
for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.,,16 Because the specific 
allegations in Central Bank involved misrepresentations, the Court, in 
particular, noted that recognition of aiding and abetting liability would 
impermissibly dispense with a showing of plaintiff's reliance on the de-
fendant's statementsP Since Central Bank, lower courts have grappled 
with the dividing line between primary and secondary liability with re-
spect to both types of Rule 10b-5 fraud. 
Rule 10b-5(b) requires, first and foremost, a misstatement or ornis-
sion of a material fact. Omissions of material facts, however, do not 
constitute Rule lOb-5 fraud unless there is a duty to disclose the infor-
mation, and courts have been reluctant to recognize a disclosure duty 
outside of a fiduciary relationship.18 Schatz v. Rosenberlf9 provides a 
vivid illustration of this principle. In that case, plaintiffs sold their busi-
ness to a buyer who later declared bankruptcy and defaulted on pay-
ment. They alleged that the law firm representing the buyer committed 
fraud because it kept silent even though it knew of its client's insol-
vency. To bolster the claims, they introduced an opinion from the state 
bar association that the attorney had an ethical duty either to disclose 
the information or to withdraw from representation. The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that the law 
16. Id. at 191. 
17. Id at 180. 
18. See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 4-5 & nn.18-21. 
19. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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firm only "papered the deal" and did not participate in the negotiations. 
Therefore, the lawyer did not make any misrepresentations, and, ac-
cording to the court, his ethical obligation did not create a legal duty to 
disclose under federal securities laws.20 
Perhaps the outcome in Schatz is correct, since the buyers could 
not have had any reasonable expectation that the seller's attorney would 
be looking out for them. After all, the transaction was a classic example 
of arms-length bargaining. In contrast, where the plaintiffs are investing 
in the enterprise, the argument can be made that the corporation's at-
torney does owe them a duty since the plaintiffs are becoming partici-
pants in a joint enterprise with the corporate client and, if the invest-
ment is stock, are also becoming the ultimate owners of the attorney's 
client. An analogy can be found in classic insider trading liability under 
Rule lOb-5, which is premised on a fiduciary relationship between the 
shareholders (including purchasers, who by the transaction become 
shareholders) and corporate insiders, including temporary insiders like 
the corporate attorneys.21 Courts have not, however, distinguished 
Schatzon this basis, and have not recognized a fiduciary relationship be-
tween an attorney representing a corporate client and its investors who 
were misled by the corporation's public misstatements.22 In order to be 
liable, an attorney must make a misrepresentation of a material fact on 
which investors relied. Rubin v.· Schottenstein, Zox & DumP provides 
a useful contrast with Schatz. In that case the attorney for the corpora-
tion in which the plaintiffs were investing told them that everything was 
"fine" with the bank, when, in fact, as the attorney knew, the plaintiffs' 
investment would constitute a default under the corporation's loan 
agreement with the bank. The Sixth Circuit, reversing the lower court's 
summary judgment for the attorney, held that liability could be imposed 
on the attorney for his voluntary disclosure of false information, not be-
cause of any fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the inves-
tors.24 
20. Id. at 487-89, 497. 
21. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 
n.14 (1983). 
22. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989) (holding that attorneys for the bond issuer's 
underwriters had no duty to discover and disclose fraud to the purchasers of the bonds); Greenberg 
Traurig of N.Y., P.e. v. Moody, 161 S.W.3d 56, 80 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that a law firm had no 
duty to investigate and disclose to investors adverse information about the CEO and the corpora-
tion). In contrast, the corporation's general counsel, who remained silent when the CEO misrepre-
sented the corporation's financial condition to suppliers, could be liable for negligent misrepresenta-
tions under state law; he owed them a duty to disclose because of the confidence they placed in him 
because of his position. Schnelling v. Budd, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193 (D. Nev. 2003). 
23. 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
24. Id at 265-66; see also Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1491 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the attorney who contracted to provide custodial services and made misrepresentations 
about the collateral was liable to plaintiffs, who were third party beneficiaries of the contract). 
HeinOnline -- 46 Washburn L.J. 95 2006-2007
2006] Tattlers and Trail Blazers 95 
Accordingly, in the context of a law firm's representation of a cor-
porate client, where the attorneys assist in the preparation of SEC fil-
ings and other communications to the public, a critical issue25 after Cen-
tral Bank is whether the attorney made a misstatement. Lower courts 
are struggling to develop a workable test for identifying primary viola-
tors. The Second Circuit, in Wright v. Brost & Young, L.L.p.,26 adopted 
a "bright-line" rule: a secondary actor could not be liable unless the mis-
statement was "attributed to [him] at the time of its dissemination," be-
cause, in its view, reliance on a misstatement necessarily entails knowl-
edge of the speaker's identity.27 Under the "bright-line" rule, attorneys 
will not be held liable where the only allegations are that they "played a 
significant role in drafting, creating, reviewing or editing allegedly 
fraudulent letters or press releases,,,28 and there are no allegations that 
there were misstatements attributable to the law firm that were dissemi-
nated to the plaintiffs or the investing public.29 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit has stated that it is sufficient to establish a defendant's liability if 
he has substantially participated in the preparation of the fraudulent 
statements, even if that preparation did not lead to his actual making of 
the misstatements.3o 
Thus, the positions taken by the Second Circuit and the Ninth Cir-
cuit are at opposite ends of the spectrum. The Second Circuit takes the 
requirement of reliance to an extreme by requiring knowledge of the 
identity of the speaker, and the Ninth Circuit essentially renames the 
"substantial assistance" test for aiding and abetting as "substantial par-
ticipation." Klein v. Boyd,31 a Third Circuit opinion that was vacated 
pending an en banc rehearing that never occurred, set forth a middle 
ground. It held that when the attorney plays a substantial role in the 
25. In addition, (1) the defendant must act with scienter, Ernst & Erost v. Hochfelder,425 U.S. 
185,193 (1976); (2) the defendant must know, or at least should have known, that his misstatement 
would be disseminated to investors, Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod, Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 
1996); (3) the plaintiffs must rely on the misstatement, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994); and (4) the misstatement must cause the injury, Lentell v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172-73 (2d Cir. 2005). Cases holding that attorneys may be liable 
for misstatements in opinion letters that were provided to investors include Kline v. First W Gov't 
Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) and Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991). 
26. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
27. Id. at 175. 
28. Ziemba v. Cascade In!'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 2001). 
29. A district court in the Second Circuit announced a modified version of the bright-line test in 
In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319,331 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), holding that the ac-
counting firm could be liable, even though not identified in the document, when it helped to create 
the false statements and the firm's role as the corporation's auditor was well known to investors. 
30. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2(00); In re Software 
Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Wenneman v. Bf{. wn, 49 F. Supp. 2d 
1283 (D. Utah 1999) (finding allegations that a law firm drafted documents in connection with a 
scheme to sell unregistered shares sufficient to allege primary liability). 
31. [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,136 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), vacated 
pending rehearing en bane, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,165 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 
1998). Because the parties settled, the en banc hearing never occurred. 
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creation of a document that is disseminated to investors, he can be con-
sidered its author or co-author if he knows (or is reckless in not know-
ing) that investors will rely on the statement and is aware (or is reckless 
in not being aware) that the document contains a material misstatement 
or omission. The lawyer speaking "behind the scenes" is subject to the 
duty to speak truthfully, even though the document is not attributed to 
him.32 
Until recently, courts did not have much occasion to focus on 
claims brought under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), where the gravamen of the 
securities fraud is conduct and not misrepresentations. But, perhaps as 
a consequence of Wright, plaintiffs are now more frequently alleging 
wide ranging fraudulent schemes.33 The Second Circuit, in SEC v. U.S. 
Environmental, Inc.,34 held that a broker who followed the directions of 
a stock promoter and executed stock trades to further the promoter's 
manipulative scheme could be primarily liable for stock manipulation so 
long as he knew (or was reckless in not knowing) that the trades were 
manipulative, even if he did not share the promoter's specific purpose to 
manipulate the market for that stock. The court distinguished the bro-
ker from defendants who were not found primarily liable in other cases: 
the broker did not simply fail to disclose information when he had no 
duty to do so, or fail to prevent another party from engaging in a fraudu-
lent act when there was no duty to prevent it. Instead, he engaged in 
manipulative conduct.35 
U.S. Environmentalthus suggests that corporate attorneys could be 
held liable for their substantial participation in a corporate fraud if the 
claim is based on conduct and not misrepresentations. Just as stock 
brokers can commit fraud by knowingly executing phony trades, lawyers 
can commit fraud by knowingly advising their clients, and drafting the 
documentation, for phony transactions. However, the Supreme Court 
has sent conflicting messages about what constitutes proscribed conduct 
under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,36 a 
private claim for damages, it defined "manipulation" narrowly, viewing 
it as virtually a term of art;37 by contrast, in SEC v. Zandford,38 an en-
32. Chavin v. McKelvey, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,325 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 29, 1998); see also Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334 
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that primary liability did not require identification of the maker of the mis-
representation). 
33. The elements under these paragraphs are: "(1) committed a deceptive or manipulative act, 
(2) [made] with scienter, that (3) the act affected the market for securities or was otherwise in con-
nection with their purchase or sale, and that (4) defendants' actions caused the plaintiffs' injuries." 
In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
34. 155 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1998). 
35. Id at 112. 
36. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
37. Id at 473. 
38. 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
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forcement action, it viewed manipulative conduct more expansively. 
The trial in In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA 
Litigatiod9 is scheduled to begin in spring 2007 and may bring the issue 
of attorneys' liability to center stage. Purchasers of Enron securities 
filed this securities fraud class action against a number of defendants, 
including several law firms. The trial court previously denied a motion 
to dismiss the complaint against one law firm, Vinson & Elkins, but 
granted the motion as to Kirkland & Ellis.40 While the court described 
Enron as a Ponzi scheme and discussed generally liability based on con-
duct, its decision focused on liability based on misrepresentations. In 
doing so, it relied heavily on a "co-creator" test as explicated by the 
SEC in its amicus brief. Specifically, the court found that an attorney 
could be held liable "if he or she writes misrepresentations for inclusion 
in a document to be given to investors, even if the idea ... came from 
someone else,,,41 and even if the statement is not publicly attributed to 
him. 
The court's middle-ground position is made clear in its discussion 
of the allegations against Vinson & Elkins. It strongly suggested that 
allegations that the law firm had to know of the ongoing fraud, that it 
structured and provided advice on illicit transactions, and that it chose 
to engage in illegal activity for lucrative fees were insufficient to impose 
liability on the law firm. What made the law firm's involvement more 
than "substantial participation" was the allegation that the law firm 
drafted many of the public statements about Enron's business and fi-
nancial situation. "[I]n light of its alleged voluntary, essential, material, 
and deep involvement as a primary violator in the ongoing Ponzi 
scheme, Vinson & Elkins was not merely a drafter, but essentially a co-
author of the documents created for public consumption concealing [the 
fraud].,,42 The court, however, dismissed the complaint as to Kirkland 
& Ellis, finding that it only alleged the performance of routine legal ser-
vices for some of the Enron-controlled entities. Specifically, the law 
firm "never made any material misrepresentations or omissions to inves-
tors or the public generally.,,43 
39. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). On November 1, 2006, the Fifth Circuit agreed to 
hear an appeal from several defendants, including Vincent & Elkins, challenging the district court's 
class-action certification. See Chron.com, Around the Region, http://www.chron.comJdisp/story.mpl! 
business!4327099.html (last visited Nov. 18,2006). 
40. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (grant-
ing motion to dismiss as to Kirkland & Ellis). The law firm subsequently settled for $13.5 million. 
See Update on UC's Enron Investments and Lawsuits - University of California News Room, 
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edulnews/enronl (last visited Nov. 18,2006). 
41. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588. 
42. Id. at 705. 
43. Id. at 706. The court subsequently dismissed claims against another law firm that per-
formed services for Enron and related entities for similar reasons. See In re Enron Corp., No. H-01-
3624,2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39927 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5,2005). 
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Therefore, at least according to the Enron court, attorneys can be 
liable when their substantial participation in the clients' fraud includes 
crafting public misstatements on which the public relies, without the ne-
cessity of identifying them as the maker of those statements. Whether 
the Fifth Circuit will adopt this legal test awaits another day (assuming 
that the trial goes forward and evidence provides sufficient support for 
the allegations). 
The collapse of Parmalat, the Italian Enron, has produced a series 
of opinions in the Southern District of New York exploring theories of 
primary liability.44 After the corporation's insolvency, investors brought 
suit against the banks, accounting firms, and law firm, seeking to hold 
them liable, under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c), for their role in structuring 
and participating in a series of complex sham transactions to improve 
the corporation's bottom line.45 Plaintiffs alleged that the law firm, 
which was set up to act as Parmalat's New York office, was the "nerve 
center" of the fraud and that its attorneys used their legal skills to design 
and perpetrate the transactions that comprised the fraudulent scheme. 
Specifically, Parmalat engaged in fictitious transactions with two shell 
companies that were "created and controlled by" the corporation's prin-
cipal attorney.46 The court held that these allegations were sufficient to 
state a claim of primary liabilityY 
Difficult questions remaiq after the Parmalat cases. While pains-
takingly drawing a distinction between the two forms of securities fraud 
under Rule lOb-5, the court provides little guidance on how to apply the 
distinction. While both Enron and Parmalat involved massive, complex 
and pervasive financial frauds (both have been referred to as Ponzi 
schemes) that are distinct from the cases involving garden-variety mis-
representations in press releases or SEC filings, the distinction between 
fraud as conduct and fraud as misrepresentations is elusive. In addition, 
Parmalat does not provide much guidance on when participation in a 
scheme becomes so substantial that the participant can be said to be 
"using or employing" a deceptive device, the statutory language the 
court focused on.48 While the judge admonished that basing liability on 
conduct is not an "end-run" around Wright, the two lines of cases seem 
44. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the liability 
of the banks); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the liability 
of the accountants); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the 
liability of the law firm). 
45. Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants made false and misleading public statements un-
der Rule lOb-5(b), but the court dismissed these claims because of the bright-line rule of Wright. 
46. Parmalat, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 625-26. 
47. Id. at 627; see also In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335-37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that accounting firm may be liable under Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) as the archi-
tect and creator of the accounting schemes used to inflate the company's financials). 
48. For example, even the classic manipulative scheme in u.s. Environmental involves at least 
an implicit misrepresentation that the trade is a bona fide transaction. 
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on a collision course. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit disagrees with the 
Parmalat court's expansive view of fraudulent conduct. In its view, the 
only form of fraudulent conduct covered by Rule 10b-5 is stock manipu-
lation; thus, unless the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a mis-
representation or engaged in stock manipulation, he cannot be liable 
under Rule lOb_5.49 
While the causes for the massive and brazen frauds like Enron, 
Parmalat, Worldcom, et alia, are many and varied, elimination of aiding 
and abetting liability as a deterrent surely played a part.50 Whether the 
attempts by some lower courts to broaden the category of primary viola-
tors will survive review by the Supreme Court remains to be seen. The 
best solution would be a congressional amendment allowing aiding and 
abetting liability in private actions. The failure of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act to provide additional remedies for defrauded investors is one of the 
legislation's significant failings.51 
II. ArrORNEY MALPRACTICE 
Professor Steinberg analyzes the SEC Rules of Professional Con-
duct, adopted pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set forth 
minimum standards of professional conduct for securities attorneys.52 
While the adoption of these Rules engendered much debate and con-
sternation, the obligations they impose on outside counsel are neither 
novel nor onerous. The Rules set forth the incontrovertible proposition 
that the attorney owes his professional and ethical duties to the corpo-
rate entity.53 They do not impose any duty on the attorney to investi-
gate whether his client is engaged in fraud. They do not require the at-
torney to report any fraud outside the corporation. Rather, the attorney 
cannot close his eyes when he becomes aware of corporate fraud. He 
must report it to the corporation's chief legal officer (CLO) in the first 
instance, and if the CLO's response is unsatisfactory, he must continue 
to report up the ladder. What triggers the reporting obligation "is the 
gateway to the entire set of obligations created by the SEC rules,,,54 and 
unfortunately the SEC drafted a virtually incomprehensible definition, 
49. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2006). 
SO. Prior to Central Bank, courts imposed liability on both lawyers and accountants for aiding 
and abetting. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 760 (5th ed. 2006). 
51. The only provision enhancing private remedies is the increased period for the statute of 
limitation. 15 U.S.c. § 78aa-l(a) (1994). 
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2005). 
53. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a) (2005); see also United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153, 2004 WL 
1672880, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004) (refusing to dismiss indictment against a lawyer who assisted 
executives in manipulating corporate earnings and charging him with depriving the corporation of 
"honest services" in violation of mail and fraud statutes). 
54. George M. Cohen, Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Defective Trigger of SEC Rule 
Implementing Sarbanes-Oxley's Duty to Report, 73 U.S.L.w. (BNA) 2419,2422 (2005). 
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complete with a double negative. If, in furtherance of his professional 
responsibilities, the attorney becomes aware of "evidence of a material 
violation" by the corporation or any of its officers, directors, employees 
or agents, he must report it.55 "Evidence of a matenal violation means 
credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under 
the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to con-
clude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is 
ongoing, or is about to OCCUr.,,56 Unfortunately, in the words of three 
law professors who were deeply involved in the rule-making process, 
"[t]he double-negative formulation makes the standard difficult to un-
derstand, interpret or apply.,,57 
In this section I examine whether attorneys could be held liable to 
the corporate client for failing to report management fraud. The ele-
ments of a claim for attorney malpractice are generally stated as follows: 
"(1) the duty to use such skill, prudence and diligence as members of the 
profession commonly possess; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a proximate 
connection between the breach and the injury; and (4) actual loss or 
damage. ,,58 Many commentators assume that attorneys who do not re-
port up the ladder could be found liable for malpractice59 and would be 
liable for damages caused to the entity if he breaches the duty he owes 
to his client to bring evidence of fraud to the attention of its highest 
governing body, so that the fraud can be stopped and further damage to 
the corporation averted. The question, however, is not free from doubt. 
The first obstacle is that Section 205.7 specifically states that the 
Rules do not create a private right of action against any attorney "based 
upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions," and that au-
thority to enforce compliance with the Rules is vested exclusively with 
the SEC.60 The SEC stated throughout the public comment process that 
it did not intend that the Rules would create any private right of ac-
tion.61 While the implication of a private cause of action is a judicial de-
termination based on legislative intent, the agency relied on comments 
from the sponsors of the provision that this was the intent of Congress.62 
55. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (2005). 
56. Id. § 205.2( e). "Material violation," in turn, is defined at 17 c.F.R. § 205.2(i). 
57. Cohen, supra note 54, at 2419. 
58. See, e.g., Loyd v. Paine Webber, Inc., 208 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating California 
law). 
59. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Is-
sues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 181 (2002); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud.' See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL'y 195, 224 (2003). The most thoughtful pre-Enron analysis of this issue is found at 
George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm 
to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
597 (1998). 
60. 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2005). 
61. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release 
No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI86,823, at 87,110 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
62. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Re-
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In the public comment process, suggestions were made for a safe harbor 
to protect lawyers from liability when they attempted in good faith to 
comply with the rules. The SEC went beyond this and adopted Section 
205.7 that extends to both compliance and non-compliance so that it 
would be "truly effective."63 Its commentary also specifically stated that 
the safe harbor "is intended to preclude, among other things, private in-
junctive actions seeking to compel persons to take actions under this 
part and private damages actions against such persons.,,64 
While defendants in any malpractice suits will certainly rely on Sec-
tion 205.7, it remains an open question whether this defense will prevail. 
Section 205.7 is limited to precluding private damages claims based on 
the SEC rules and is consistent with the generally accepted view that an 
ethics rule violation by itself does not create a cause of action.65 Section 
205.7, however, should not bar claims based on common law negligence 
or state law malpractice claims where the violation of Section 205.7 
should be admissible as evidence of the breach of the attorney's duty of 
care. Clients may sue their attorneys whenever the attorney has negli-
gently breached a duty of care owed to the client that resulted in mone-
tary harm. An attorney's failure to detect and report management fraud 
violates the duty of care the attorney owes to the client. This duty of 
care is inherent in the attorney-client relationship, predates adoption of 
the SEC rules and exists independently of them. The SEC Rules simply 
provide further evidence of the standard of care expected from corpo-
rate attorneys. 
In the release accompanying the final rules, the SEC referred to the 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers and the ABA Model 
Rules, both of which state that violations of the professional conduct 
rules do not create "an implied cause of action for professional negli-
gence or breach of fiduciary duty.,,66 Significantly, the SEC did not re-
fer to the last sentence of the Model Rule provision: "Nevertheless, 
since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's 
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard 
of conduct.,,67 Whether or not it was intended by the SEC, the omission 
of similar language may be interpreted as a signal from the agency that 
the SEC Rules should play no role in malpractice claims. This position 
lease. No. 46868, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 86,802, at 86,553 (Nov. 21, 
2(02). 
63. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Release. 
No. 47276, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 86,823, at 87,098 (Jan. 29, 2(03) 
[hereinafter Final Release]. 
64. Id.. The SEC also specifically referred to the safe harbor when it addressed a likely increase 
in malpractice insurance premiums as a cost of the regulation. Id. at 87,101. 
65. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 2 LEGAL MALPRACfICE § 19.7, at 1212 
(2006). 
66. Final Release, supra note 63, at 87,098. 
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer, preface (2002). 
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is contrary to the weight of authority that holds that a violation of a pro-
fessional conduct rule is admissible and at least relevant to prove the 
breach of the standard of care.68 While ultimately the issue is for the 
courts, the SEC appears to be actively discouraging the use of Section 
205.7 to establish a standard of care. 
The courts may share the SEC's reticence. Judicial alarm over an 
increasing number of legal malpractice claims can lead to, in the words 
of one commentator, unjustified protectiveness toward lawyers.69 Like 
the SEC, courts show a disinclination to recognize the breach of ethics 
standards as a basis of liability.1° They reason that the ethics rules were 
not adopted for the purpose of providing a remedy in civil litigation and 
may also reflect a concern that juries may be. unduly swayed to impose 
liability on an "unethical" attorney.71 Schatz, for example, held that an 
ethical duty to withdraw from representation or disclose information to 
a third party did not create a corresponding legal duty under federal se-
curities laws.n 
To date, most of the few relevant cases73 stem from the savings and 
loan debacle of the 1980s, when the federal regulators pursued claims 
against law firms that represented failed financial institutions to recoup 
losses caused by management fraud?4 Two of these cases are particu-
larly relevant today. 
In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers,75 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
law firm that represented a failed savings and loan association (S&L) 
could be liable to the S&L's receiver for malpractice because it failed to 
uncover management fraud in the course of its representation of the cli-
ent in connection with two estate syndications. Part of its engagement 
was to perform a due diligence review to confirm the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the disclosures in the private placement memoranda. Start-
ing with the basic proposition that "it is an attorney's duty to protect his 
client in every possible way,,,76 the court held that the law firm could be 
liable to its client if it was negligent in failing to detect and report that 
management was cooking the books and misrepresenting the S&L's fi-
68. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 4.1, at 4·6 
(3d ed. Supp. 2002); see also MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 65, at 1217. Some commentators go fur-
ther in minimizing the significance of the disclaimer. See Harris, supra note 59; David B.Wilkins, 
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 806 n.25 (1992). 
69. See also HAZARD & HODES, supra note 68, § 4.10, at 4-29 - 4-30. 
70. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Enron Corp. Sec., De-
rivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
71. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 65, § 19.7, at 1211-19. 
72. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
73. Harris attributes the paucity of caselaw to the propensity of attorneys to settle these claims. 
Harris, supra note 59, at 636. Koniak attributes it to the reluctance of corporate managers to sue law 
firms. Koniak, supra note 59, at 224. 
74. For a more extensive discussion of the cases, see Harris, supra note 59, at 619-32. 
75. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
76. Id. at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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nancial condition. While many subsequent decisions distinguish 
O'Melveny & Myers by finding that other attorneys had a more limited 
engagement that did not include a duty to investigate,77 none challenges 
the proposition that an attorney who uncovers evidence of management 
fraud is committing malpractice if he does not report up the ladder. 
FDIC v. Clark's provides a more specific discussion of what consti-
tutes attorney negligence. The bank's management perpetrated a fraud 
that involved the purchase of stolen money through loans procured 
through the bank. The jury found two instances where the attorneys, 
partners in a law firm, had received sufficient notice of the fraud that 
they should have investigated further. One attorney received a com-
plaint that was filed against the bank about irregularities in its loan pro-
cedures; another attorney negotiated a settlement of the lawsuit. More-
over, neither attorney adequately informed the board of directors about 
this law suit. There was evidence that had the directors been fully in-
formed they would have conducted an investigation and would have dis-
covered the fraud. Applying Colorado law that "(a)n attorney owes his 
client a duty to employ that degree of knowledge, skill, and judgment 
ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession,"79 the court 
found that this evidence supported a verdict of negligence.8o 
The FDIC, which acts as the receiver for failed S&L's, was the 
plaintiff in both O'Melveny & Myers and Clark. Outside of this situa-
tion, there have been few malpractice suits, suggesting reluctance on the 
part of management to pursue these claims. Because state corporate 
law limits the situations where shareholders can bring derivative suits to 
pursue corporate claims,81 it is unlikely that there will be very many 
malpractice suits brought by or on behalf of the corporation. 
III. OTHER STATE THEORIES 
Investors may seek to hold attorneys responsible under additional 
state law theories: negligent misrepresentations and secondary liabil-
ity.82 Attorneys may be liable if, in the course of their representation of 
their client, they made negligent misrepresentations to investors. Ac-
77. See. e.g., Loyd v. Paine Webber, Inc., 208 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that attor-
neys do not have a general duty to investigate whether his client is engaged in fraud). 
78. 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992); see also BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Clifford, 964 
F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1997) (discussing a corporation's negligence claims against its attorneys). 
79. Clark, 978 F.2d at 1550 (quoting Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985». 
80. See In re Am. Cont'! Corp.lLincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. 
Ariz. 1992) ("An attorney who represents a corporation has a duty to act in the corporation's best 
interest when confronted by adverse interests of directors, officers, or corporate affiliates."). 
81. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
82. For discussion of state securities law theories, see Marc I. Steinberg & Chris Claassen, At-
torney Liability Under the State Securities Laws: Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.I. 
1 (2005). 
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cording to section 552(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in 
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable re-
liance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.83 
Case law, however, exhibits a general disinclination to impose liability 
for negligent misrepresentations unless the defendant had a special duty 
to use care to make accurate representations. Thus, liability will be im-
posed only on those persons who possess unique or specialized expertise 
or who are in a special position of confidence or trust with the injured 
party.84 In Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine,85 for example, the 
court held that attorneys who reviewed and revised an offering circular 
could be liable for negligent misrepresentations to those buyers who re-
lied on it, provided that they knew or should have known that the inves-
tors would be shown the offering circular. 
In addition, investors may be able to pursue secondary liability 
claims against attorneys under state law. In Greenberg Traurig of New 
York, p.e v. Moody,86 a law firm performed legal services for a corpo-
ration whose CEO repeatedly violated a permanent injunction against 
the sale of unregistered securities. The appellate court, reversing a jury 
verdict against the law firm because of numerous errors, followed the 
prevailing law and held that the law firm owed no duty to disclose the 
fraud to the investors. It did hold, however, that the law firm could be 
liable for conspiracy to defraud the investors for its role in assisting the 
corporation in its efforts to obtain additional financing, when it knew 
that the many securities violations committed by the CEO and the cor-
poration were undisclosed.87 The attorneys argued that they were un-
aware of their client's past securities violations; however, given the seri-
ousness of these violations, Greenberg Traurig suggested that the 
attorneys should have investigated their client before undertaking to 
represent it. When the CEO has a lifetime ban on selling unregistered 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977); see also, e.g., Maliner v. Wachovia 
Bank, No. 04-60237CIV, 2005 WL 670293, *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1,2005) (allowing plaintiff's negligent 
misrepresentation claim against portfolio manager). 
84. Expertise alone may not be enough. See Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 
1431 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (expressing "unwilling[ness) to hold that in every case wherein someone with 
expertise is hired a fiduciary relationship is created."). 
85. 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991). 
86. 161 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App. 2004); see also Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 
756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that a claim was stated against law firm as a co-conspirator and for 
aiding and abetting its client's breach of fiduciary duty). 
87. Greenberg Traurig, 161 S.W.3d at 102; see also Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988) 
(holding that attorney who advised limited partnership on private placement could be liable to a pur-
chaser under state securities law for materially aiding the sale of unregistered securities, unless he 
could establish a reasonable care defense). 
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securities, the only representation the securities lawyer should be offer-
ing is an effort to rescind the prohibition. 
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 
however, severely limits the effectiveness of these state law claims since 
it preempts class actions based on untrue statements or omissions of ma-
terial facts in connection with the purchase or sale of most publicly 
traded securities.88 Congress enacted SLUSA because it was concerned 
that plaintiffs' attorneys could avoid the strictures of the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) by bringing securities class actions 
in state court. Therefore, unless there are individual investors whose 
damages are considerable, it is not economically feasible89 for plaintiffs 
to bring state law misrepresentations or omissions claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Judicial efforts to expand primary liability after Central Bank and 
the congressional directive to the SEC to adopt Rules of Professional 
Conduct stem from the Enron-era corporate scandals and the public's 
disgust that highly-paid lawyers were allegedly involved in every aspect 
of the sham transactions that deceived the marketplace. If in fact law-
yers are exposed to a greater risk of liability, they have brought it on 
themselves. 
Moreover, private actions may be necessary for adequate enforce-
ment of attorneys' professional responsibilities. There is concern in 
some quarters that state disciplinary proceedings are ineffectual in en-
forcing professional responsibilities where large corporate law firms are 
concerned.90 While the SEC's Enforcement Division recently has 
brought a number of enforcement proceedings against lawyers who have 
played some role in their clients' fraud,91 it is the Office of the General 
Counsel that is responsible for enforcing the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, and to date there are no reports of SEC enforcement of its Rules. 
So how likely is it that courts will impose liability on attorneys for 
damages caused by their clients' fraud? In my opinion, courts do not 
appear enthusiastic about using damages awards to "blaze the trail to-
88. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.). The Supreme Court, in Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Snlith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006), made clear it would interpret SLUSA 
expansively. 
89. SLUSA also permits a class of no more than 50 plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A)(i)(J). 
90. See Koniak, supra note 59, at 215. 
91. See Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: The Themes 
of Sarbanes·Oxley as Reflected in the Commission's Enforcement Program (Sept. 20, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech]spch092004smc.htm. For a critical assessment of the SEC's 
actions, see Lewis D. Lowenfels, Alan R. Bromberg, & Michael J. Sullivan, Attorneys as Gatekeep. 
ers: SEC Actions Against Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. ToL. L. REV. 877 (2006). 
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ward improved ethical standards.,,92 While some law firms have paid 
large amounts to settle these claims, the payments may be based on a 
desire to hush up the matter rather than an assessment of the probabil-
ity of plaintiffs' recovery. We must await further developments to see if 
the Enron and Parmalat cases result in new law in this area. Further-
more, at this time the extent of attorneys' involvement in the backdating 
scandal is unknown. Unfortunately, as with the S&L scandals of the 
1980's, this chapter in attorney regulation may close without significant 
improvement in attorneys' professional responsibilities.93 
92. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986). 
93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Ox/ey: Legis/ating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure 6 
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-14), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=899593 (arguing that "it will become even easier for lawyers who wish to 
turn a blind eye to client misconduct to do so"). 
